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Introduction
For more than two decades, the World Bank has been a lightning rod for transnational
civil society action. Coalitions of civil society organizations--nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), churches, indigenous peoples movements and international
environment and human rights networks--have repeatedly challenged the World Banks
high profile promotion of socially and environmentally costly development strategies.
Playing David to the Bank's Goliath is a particularly striking example of ambitious North-
South civil society campaigning. In turn, the World Bank has responded in many
different, sometimes contradictory ways, ranging from short-term damage control,
substantive policy reforms and islands of innovation on the one hand, to persistent gaps in
meeting in its own social and environmental reform commitments and more of the
same priority for structural adjustment on the other. The diversity of Bank campaigns
across countries and issues, as well as their long track records, make them especially rich
sources of lessons for understanding transnational coalitions more generally.
Recently, the WTOs debacle in Seattle led the Economist to trace those civil society
protests in part back to the 50 Years is Enough Campaign against the World Bank and
IMF in 1994. The Economist proceeded to congratulate the Bank for its subsequent effort,
2supposedly successful, to demobilize and coopt its NGO critics. The Economist
observed that
From environmental policy to debt relief, NGOs are at the center of World Bank
policy. Often they determine it. The new World Bank is more transparent, but it is
also more beholden to a new set of special interests. 2
Is it possible that NGOs have gained this much influence? Have they really demobilized
as much as is claimed?
While it is true that, since 1994, the IMF, MAI and the WTO superceded the Bank on
some protesters lists of top targets, many other advocacy groups and social organizations
 especially those closer to the ground and further from the global media spotlight --
remain deeply concerned with the issue of how to get the World Bank to live up to its
social and environmental reform commitments.3
The analytical challenge implicit in the Economists assessment is how to disentangle co-
optation from substantive concessions, while recognizing that the difference is often in
the eye of the beholder. There is, moreover, a basic contradiction in the Economists
assessment: if NGOs really did determine World Bank policy, that would suggest that
they have much more influence than the term co-optation implies. For example, if
NGOs really did determine World Bank policy, then it would be difficult to explain why
3more than half of the Banks 1999 lending went to structural adjustment for the first time
ever (a category of loan inherently far removed both from civil society levers of influence,
as well as the Banks own social and environmental reform policies). Even at the level of
specific infrastructural investments -- which offer critics more tangible targets -- the
World Bank continues to propose new projects that directly subsidize huge transnational
corporations to carry out likely environmental disasters, as in the case of Exxon and the
Chad-Cameroon pipeline.4 Also in 1999, an international debate exploded over the
discovery that the Bank was planning to fund a project called China Western Poverty
Reduction, which turned out to threaten ethnic Tibetans. In spite of the Banks well-
known, sophisticated NGO engagement, involving extensive operational collaboration,
policy consultations and enlightened discourse, in the Tibet case the institution
unknowingly stumbled over one of worlds most influential indigenous rights campaigns.
The resulting mobilization was almost as intense as the previous peak of anti-Bank
protest back in the early 1990s, leading to widespread press coverage, unusual no votes
by the US and German representatives on the Banks board, high-level international
diplomatic tensions with China, imprisonment and serious injury to NGO investigators,
an ongoing investigation by the Banks official Inspection Panel and possible suspension
of the project.5
At the same time as powerful elements within the World Bank continue to ignore its own
environmental and social reforms, in some sectors and in some countries, civil society
actors perceive the Banks enlightened discourse as an important partial opening,
4especially under regimes that are even less enlightened than the World Bank. Moreover,
at least some controversial projects that once would have sailed through the approval
process are now subjected to greater scrutiny in the design phase, both internally and
externally. The Banks involvement in post-conflict situations also creates opportunities
for constructive leadership, as in the case of East Timor. The overall result is a highly
uneven, patchwork quilt pattern of partial reforms combined with entrenched resistance to
change. In brief, transnational campaigns continue to challenge the World Bank, they
have had some degree of influence. In the process, with their long track record, they have
sought to build ever more balanced partnerships between Northern and Southern civil
society actors.
This paper explores these patterns by drawing on a series of case of transnational
coalition efforts aimed at influencing World Bank policies and projects studies, carried
out over the last eight years under the auspices of the Institute for Development
Research.6 The paper seeks to extract from those cases lessons about successful influence
efforts.  More particularly, the paper will focus on two questions:
(1) What is required for transnational coalitions to influence institutions like the
World Bank?
(2) How can transnational coalition members be accountable to each other across
large gaps of power, wealth and culture?
5The Transnational Coalitions Study
This study explores critical factors embedded in complex, long-term campaigns.  We
chose to develop in-depth case studies and then compare those cases to see what sorts of
patterns emerged.  The cases were written by individuals close to events on the ground
with access to both the grassroots populations involved and decision makers at the World
Bank and other agencies.  Four cases focused on coalition efforts to influence specific
development projects--a geothermal plant in the Philippines, a natural resource
management project in Brazil, petroleum and land legislation linked to structural
adjustment in Ecuador, and a dam in Indonesia.7 Four other  cases focused on coalition
efforts to shape Bank policies on critical issues--indigenous peoples, water resources
management, resettlement of populations ousted by projects, and information and
inspection panel policy.8 Tables 1 and 2 summarize major features of the project and
policy cases.
Table 1: Project Reform Campaigns
Projects and Key Actors Critical Events in Alliance Evolution
Kedung Ombo Dam,
Indonesia (198494)
GRO: Oustees, students
NGO: Local and national legal
aid; other local and national
poverty and environment
NGOs
BO: International NGO Group
on Indonesia (INGI)
INGO: members of INGI from
Northern countries
Most families were not aware of relocation plans until the dam was
almost finished.  Then some families asked local and national legal aid
NGOs for help getting more compensation for their land.  Some suits
were eventually successful, but the Government invalidated the
judgments.  INGI began to lobby the World Bank via its international
members in 1988.  Popular protests by students and religious groups
supported oustees after dam completion in 1989.  INGI meetings with
the World Bank led to government attacks on INGI for "washing dirty
linen" in public.  The government did make other land available to
oustees.  The Bank and other international actors agreed to avoid future
"Kedung Ombos".
Mt. Apo Thermal Plant, 
Philippines (198793)
GRO: Indigenous peoples
groups; local farmers.
NGO: local, regional, national
networks; Legal Resources
Center.
BO: PDF (Philippine
Development Forum); BIC
(Bank Information Center).
INGO: Environmental Defense
Fund; Columban Fathers;
Greenpeace.
Indigenous groups and farmers began to organize local, regional and
national networks to challenge the project in 1987.  Elders of local
tribes swore to defend Mt. Apo to "the last drop of blood".  Local
coalitions built links to INGOs and the PDF.  Two Bank missions drew
contradictory conclusions about the project.  In 1989, the Philippine
Development forum of NGOs and INGOs agreed to lobby the Bank on
Mount Apo.  The GoP (Government of the Philippines) certified project
for environmental compliance in spite of protests.  National "solidarity
conferences" among NGO networks agreed to emphasize indigenous
rights and carefully monitor lobbying of PDF.  PDF lobbying helped the
World Bank reject the government's environmental impact assessment,
and GoP withdrew loan request.  In 1993, further solidarity conferences
set strategies for lobbying export-import Banks.
Planafloro Natural
Resources, Brazil (198995)
GRO: Rubber tappers, farmers
NGO: Local and national
NGOs and networks (e.g.,
IAMA, CNS, IEA, and others).
BO: Rondonia NGO Forum,
INGO: EDF, World Wildlife
Federation, others
INGOs(such as Environmental Defense Fund) protested lack of local
participation in initial design in 1989, in part because few GROs were
organized in the region.  The Bank suspended the project until the
Rondonia NGO Forum was created to enable local and international
(but not national) NGOs to participate in project decisions in 1991.  It
became clear that state agencies would violate loan terms in spite of the
Forum, and Forum protests carried little weight.  The Forum requested
that the Bank suspend disbursement in 1994 and asked the Inspection
Panel to review the project in 1995.  Planafloro accepted as case by
Bank Inspection Panel that year.
Ecuador Structural
Adjustment, Ecuador
(198694)
GRO: Indigenous peoples (IP)
groups; environmental groups
NGO: CONAIE (IP
federation); Accion Ecologica
BO: Ecuador Network, BIC
(Bank Information Center)
INGO: Rainforest Action
Network; Oxfam; CAIA
The Federation of Indigenous Peoples (CONAIE) mobilized IP groups. 
In 1990 it helped organize an uprising against structural adjustment.  In
1992 it allied with NGOs to challenge World Bank and government oil
extraction initiatives which threatened indigenous groups.  Negotiations
with the Bank and the government altered the oil law.  In 1994
CONAIE led a national "Mobilization for Life" coalition against a
proposed land law which threatened access to communally-held lands
and paralyzed the country.  CONAIE created the Ecuador Network with
INGOs to influence Bank policy-making.  Eventually, negotiations with
government leaders and agribusiness interests produced a more
acceptable land law and a larger policy role for CONAIE in the future.
Note:  GRO means Grassroots Organization; NGO means Local or National NGO; BO
means Bridging Organization; INGO means International NGO.
Table 2: Policy Reform Campaigns
Policies and Key Actors Critical Events in Alliance Evolution
Indigenous Peoples Policy
(198192)
GROs: Indigenous peoples (IP)
and environment movements in
many countries
NGOs: Linked to project
alliances
INGOs: International Survival,
IWGIA, Cultural Survival.
WB: Social scientists; IP policy
supporters
In 1981, indigenous groups at the Chico River in the Philippines won
their first victory over a Bank dam project, leading to an initial Bank
policy protecting indigenous rights in its projects.  IP problems in
Bank projects were highlighted in a series of projects (Polonoereste,
Transmigration, etc.) and by the Banks 1987 five-year review of
environmental policies.  Active local movements lobbied Bank
projects successfully over the next five years.  INGOs supporting
indigenous peoples did not develop a common front, but GROs were
quite successful in influencing local projects.  The Banks 1991 policy
statement opened the door to further indigenous challenges.
Resettlement Policy (198694)
GROs: Oustee movements in
many projects
NGOs: Allies of oustees like
Narmada Bachao Andolan
INGOs: Narmada Action
Council, International NGO
Group on Indonesia
WB: Resettlement Review Task
Force
The Resettlement Policy Review was in part inspired by the
revelations of the Morse Commission about the controversial
Narmada project.  An internal team was authorized to assess
implementation of the resettlement policy in Bank projects to respond
to external campaigns.  The review indicated that compliance with the
Banks 1986 policy was running at about 30 percent in the first five
years.  It improved rapidly under external and internal scrutiny,
though the review team had to fight a "guerilla war" to get good
information from reluctant task managers.  Intense internal bargaining
over the final report culminated in early publication in 1994 to
forestall threats of leaks by external advocates.
Water Resources Management
Policy (199193)
GROs: Not involved
NGOs: 50 volunteered to
provide input to policy
discussions;
INGOs: International Rivers
Network; Environmental
Defense Fund
WB: Operations and Engineering
staff
In 1991, Bank staff organized a workshop for government officials on
revising water resource management policy.  NGOs were not invited,
but INGOs collected comments from more than 50 NGOs.  The Bank
agreed to consult with NGOs and received substantial inputs.  The
INGOs found it difficult to maintain NGO interest in the policy
process. Bank officials decided against further consultations, in part
because of internal pressures to shape policies by economic
considerations.  Ultimately, the INGOs lobbied with Executive
Directors to affect the policy.  Though the policies adopted did
include some NGO recommendations, the initiators were disappointed
in the necessity for a retreat to advocacy.
Information and Inspection
Panel Policy (198995)
GROs: Not directly involved
NGOs: Narmada, IDA-10
Campaign activists.
INGOs: EDF; BIC; other Bank
Reform Campaigners; Fifty
Years is Enough
WB: Allies of more disclosure
policy
Others: Congressional
Committee; US, Japan, Europe
EDs.
The Bank has always limited access to project information.  The
struggle over the Narmada Dams and the criticisms of the internal
Wapenhans Report set the stage for many Bank reforms.  The alliance
among INGOs, NGOs and GROs which carried out the Narmada and
the IDA-10 replenishment campaigns pressed the Bank for policies
making more project information available at early stages and for an
Inspection Panel to investigate project abuses.  With allies from
within the Bank and the US Congress, the alliance successfully
lobbied for the new policy with threats to withhold future funding. 
The new panel was immediately asked to investigate the proposed
Arun III Dam In Nepal. Its report raised serious questions about the
Dam, and the new Bank President canceled the project soon after
entering the office. 
Note: GRO means Grassroots Organization; NGO means National NGO; INGO means
8International NGO; WB means World Bank staff; Others means other alliance participants.
9These cases are reported and compared in considerable detail elsewhere 9(Fox and
Brown, 1998).  In this paper we present some important lessons suggested by those
detailed analyses.  The next two sections present and illustrate eight lessons, four
concerning coalition impacts and four concerning coalition organization and
accountability.  Then we comment briefly on the implications of these lessons for future
international coalitions to influence global institutions and policies.
Lessons about Coalition Impacts
It is clear that influencing an institution like the World Bank is not a short-term, low-
investment process.  Making a difference requires a sustained, cohesive coalition capable
of mobilizing and analyzing information relevant to Bank activities, making that
information available to key actors, and mobilizing many sources of influence.  The
analysis of these cases suggests the first four lessons about effective transnational
coalitions.
Lesson 1:  Make the campaign fit the target. Different goals require different kinds of
coalitions. 
We found that different patterns of coalitions emerged to deal with different issues.  For
some coalitions, the dominant issue was moderating or undoing harmful impacts of
specific Bank projects on grassroots communities.  In the Philippines, for example, the
coalition challenged the building of a geothermal power plant threatened indigenous
peoples sacred ancestral lands as well negative environmental impacts . In Ecuador, an
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agricultural development program involved legislation, which threatened the communal
lands of indigenous peoples.  The new land law, passed with support from multilateral
development banks as well as agribusiness interests, made it likely that communally held
lands would become vulnerable to sale for commercial development.  In both cases, the
transnational coalition was spearheaded and sustained by grassroots movements that were
directly threatened by the projects, together with national NGO allies who in turn sought
international support.  Because these campaigns were essentially the international wings
of already-existing national movements, we, called them national problem coalitions. 
In other settings, the campaign coalition was primarily concerned with Bank failures to
live up to its own policies.  While impacts on local constituents were evidence of Bank
failures, the primary target was reform of the Bank itself. In Brazils Planafloro case, for
example, international NGOs challenged the Banks failure to ensure local participation in
the natural resources management project in a setting where grassroots groups were not
yet sufficiently organized to mount a credible protest on their own initiative.  Similarly,
the campaign to expand public access to information on Bank projects and to create an
institutional channel for responding to charges of noncompliance with reform policies as
initiated and pressed by coalitions led by international NGOs, in part because they had the
technical policy skills, political influence with donor governments, and the organizational
resources to maintain pressure across many projects, in spite of not having immediate
stakes in each.  Such transnational advocacy networks can articulate principles, formulate
alternative policies, and press for improved implementation and systemic reform over
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long periods of time and across many local instances of abuse.
In still other cases, coalition leadership came from within the Bank, as internal reformers
worked with external groups to review Bank experience and articulate alternative
policies.  In the review of the resettlement policy, for example, an internal team designed
and implemented a review which resulted in massive resistance from internal
constituencies committed to preserving their autonomy and freedom from criticism.  The
existence of strong external coalitions that supported the internal review made it possible
for that team to challenge powerful entrenched interests in the review, and ultimately to
publish a very searching report despite the resistance.  In essence, such internal reform
initiatives make use of the special knowledge and access of insiders to marshal evidence
and articulate plausible reforms.
Coalition tactics need to be defined in the context of its goals and targets.  When the
focus is controlling project damage or shaping implementation on the ground, the local
actors to whom both the World Bank and international NGO critics should be
accountable are often relatively clear-cut.  When the focus is on articulating the broader
policies which will shape future Bank interactions with grassroots actors, international
NGOs, with their policy knowledge, media savvy and lobbying skills, tend to play more
prominent leadership roles.  Where the target is fundamental change in Bank priorities or
institutional arrangements, internal reform alliances which unite internal staff holding
special knowledge with sources of external leverage may be needed to influence Bank
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policy-makers who resist reforms.
Lesson 2:  Open up the cracks in the system. Assess targets for leverage in terms of
institutional politics and potential allies.
It is easy to think of the World Bank and other large actors as monolithic institutions that
present united fronts to external challengers.  This assumption can focus coalition
attention exclusively on allies outside the Bank.  But these cases suggest that failure to
engage with potential allies that emerge from intra-institutional politics can be a costly
mistake.
In actuality, the Bank, like many other large institutions, includes staff with a wide range
of political and social perspectives.  In all the cases in this study, some Bank staff
strongly favored reforms advanced by external coalitions, and those coalitions often
benefited from the advice, information and support given by internal actors.  The most
effective campaigns built coalitions among progressive groups in many different
institutions.  The campaign against the Philippines geothermal plant, for example, found
that different Bank departments involved in the project had made conflicting
recommendations for handling the indigenous peoples lands.  In that case, the struggle
among different constituencies within the Bank was an important asset to the external
campaign.  Identifying sympathetic actors within the Bank can help coalitions understand
issues as they are perceived within the Bank, recognize plausible alternatives given Bank
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priorities, and build the internal support needed to implement reforms.
From the point of view of internal reformers, contacts with or even the existence of
external coalitions concerned about an issue may strengthen their ability to deal with
internal resistance to reform.  When senior management threatened to suppress the
resettlement review as excessively controversial, the possibility that external challengers
might publish early drafts eventually compelled publicationto avoid the embarrassment
public accusations of a cover-up of Bank failures to implement its own policies. 
Institutional change in an agency like the Bank is almost inevitably partial and slow, but
these cases demonstrate that internal reformers often depend significantly on the
existence of external pressure and scrutiny.
It should also be recognized that in certain issue areas, both internal reformers and
external pressure groups clearly lack the leverage needed to outweigh very influential
interest groups and their donor government allies. For example, the contrast between
NGO impact on the Banks environmental and social policies and its sharply increased
emphasis on structural adjustment and financial sector bailouts is quite notable.
Lesson 3:  Impact comes in different forms. Recognize multiple forms of success and
the tradeoffs among them. 
It is easy for coalition members to focus on a few campaign goals--change the policy, stop
the project, enhance the resettlement program--to measure success.  Such criteria,
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however, obscure important complexities and possibilities.  In these campaigns, "success"
definitions often shifted over time as new strategies came into play or new actors joined
the fray.  The more effective coalitions recognized that the campaigns could succeed or
fail on several dimensions--including strengthening local organizations, building links for
future campaigns, increasing awareness and skills for policy influence, evolving strategies
and tactics for policy participation, shaping public awareness of critical issues, and
encouraging target institution reforms--in addition to shaping specific project and policy
outcomes.
Campaigns which do not succeed in direct influence may still be considered to have had
significant impact when measured by more indirect indicators.  The campaign to stop the
implementation of  Indonesias Kedung Ombo dam was too late to stop the dam; even the
successful court challenge to inadequate compensation policies was voided by the
government.  On the other hand, the campaign enhanced the reputation of the association
of national and international NGOs that lobbied the Bank and donor governments on the
issue.  The network of national and international NGOs that participated in the campaign
built relationships and capacities that served them well in subsequent campaigns.  The
campaign also led to informal commitments by several donor agencies to avoid such
projects in the futureNo more Kedung Ombos.
Making good judgements about tradeoffs among objectives may require a broad historical
and societal perspective.  In the Philippines, for example, the campaign to stop the Mount
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Apo thermal plant focused on the projects violation of the rights of indigenous peoples,
in part because that issue was, at the time, more publicly visible and politically potent
than the parallel concerns of farmers and environmentalists.  While some
environmentalists and farmers disagreed with the decision to de-emphasize their interests
and grievances, the focus on indigenous peoples rights helped to mobilize support from
national indigenous networks and their allies at a time when their concerns were at the
center of political attentionand so helped raise widespread awareness about the Mt.
Apo issue.
Lesson 4:  Create footholds that give a leg up to those who follow. Propose institutional
arrangements that enable future civil society influence.
The interests of grassroots constituencies are often focused on the direct impacts of
projects, but changes in policies and other institutional arrangements may have more
impacts in the long run.  Project campaigns focus on specific issues affecting particular
countries.  Combinations of project campaigns may focus on institutional arrangements
that affect many future activities.
Changes in Bank policies, for example, reshape the institutional context within which
project managers operate.  Many transnational campaigns have been focused on
establishing or refining the organizational policies that guide Bank projects.  The
adoption of a new policy does not guarantee its implementation, of coursea reality that
has been amply demonstrated by the review of compliance with the resettlement policy. 
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But the existence of a policy standard does create leverage when external coalitions can
demonstrate that Bank projects have failed to comply with it.  Bank staff have become
sensitized to the embarrassment created by failures to meet their own policies.  Thus
project compliance with the resettlement policy improved dramatically as it became clear
that the review process was going to make non-compliance highly visible.  So promoting
policies that protect indigenous peoples or resettled populations can create leverage for
confronting future abuses.
Campaigns promoting pro-accountability institutional arrangements may have even
bigger impacts. Information policies that make project information available early in the
project cycle can enable early challenge of problematic programs.  It is much easier to
influence projects in the design stage than it is to revise them after a variety of national
and international interests are vested in project completion.  Influence at early stages is
difficult if no information is available, however.  Institutional arrangements for wider and
earlier sharing of project information are essential to early action.  Altering policies and
institutional arrangements that govern information availability can enrich options for
future campaigns. 
Coalition Organization and Accountability
Transnational coalitions often span great differences in cultural backgrounds, economic
wealth and political power.  Rubber tappers in Brazil and indigenous farmers in the
Philippines can be as organizationally distant from the Washington-based leaders of the
Environmental Defense Fund as they are from World Bank policy-makers.  For coalitions
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to be effective over years of under-resourced struggle, they need to build shared
strategies, bonds of trust, and recognition of each others resources which can sustain
collective action in spite of the conflicts and misunderstandings inherent in the gaps that
separate them.  This study also asked how transnational coalitions could be organized to
enable mutual influence and accountability in spite of these differences.  The results of
this analysis are briefly described in the next four lessons.
Lesson 5:  Leveraging accountability requires specifying accountability to whom. 
Broad social bases enable credible representation and local voice.
Transnational coalitions are sometimes initiated by grassroots movements seeking to
pursue their goals through international linkages.  The Ecuador Network, for example,
was initiated by the federation of indigenous organizations that led the national campaign
against the new Ecuadoran land law.  But it is more common for grassroots constituencies
to be poorly connected with each other, and consequently to have difficulty in speaking to
powerful opponents with a united voice..  In the Indonesian and Brazilian cases, for
example, few credible voices emerged to speak for grassroots interests.  Transnational
coalitions often seek to represent grassroots interests to national and international
decision-makers, but have difficulty in establishing exactly which voices are genuinely
representative of local constituencies.
These cases suggest that coalition organizers are wise to find or foster horizontal linkages
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among constituencies in order to enable credible local voices.  Where social capital, in the
form of grassroots federations, already exists, as in the Philippines and Ecuador cases, the
coalition can build on genuine local representation. The local, regional, and national
coalitions and shared decision-making in the Philippines enabled ongoing consultations
with indigenous interests to maintain coalition legitimacy.  In Ecuador, the coalition of
indigenous groups was seen as providing genuine representation to the majority of their
members.  In other situations, a coalition with genuine grassroots representation may
depend on local organization building.  In the Brazil case, for example,  an alliance of
local NGOs and grassroots groups did not emerge until relatively late in the project,
although the Rondonia NGO Forum became in important actor in subsequent years.
While grassroots voices are often particularly difficult to mobilize, similar problems may
affect the participation of other coalition members.  The effort to shape policy on water
resource management, for example, found it difficult to mobilize national NGOs, given
the expense of transportation and the lack of immediate impacts of policy decisions. 
Ironically, the press to keep directly affected constituencies involved in the coalition
comes in part from the Bank.  Bank staff have frequently  challenged civil society
coalitions for not representing real grassroots constituencies, and so pressed transnational
coalitions to attend to their own legitimacy and accountability..
Lesson 6:  Power and communication gaps within civil society need bridges. Build
interorganizational "chains" to connect organizationally distant partners.
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Coalitions across geographic, cultural, economic and political differences may require
substantial investments in order to build the mutual influence and trust which enables a
quick and cohesive response to changing circumstances.  The challenge of building such
relationships between a Washington-based lobbyist and a Brazilian rubber tapper,
separated by language, economic fate, political perspective and cultural values, may be
formidable.  Constructing and maintaining such transnational social capitalcan be
difficult and expensive, but it is central to creating and maintaining effective coalitions.
In our cases, coalitions seldom depended on bonds across such great organizational
distances.  More common were organizational chains of relatively short links that
spanned great organizational distances.  Thus, in the Philippines coalition, the elders of
the indigenous groups connected horizontally with local NGOs, church groups and other
local network members, and vertically with the regional indigenous leaders and regional
campaign representatives.  Those regional representatives, in turn, were connected
vertically with the national network.  National network representatives worked with
members of the Philippine Development Forum, a Washington-based group of Philippine
and international NGOs concerned with Philippines development.  The resulting chain
spanned the smaller gaps from local to regional to national to international--more
manageable organizational distances than the gap from local to international.
In addition to building new links for these chains, in these cases coalitions built in part on
previously existing social capital.  The national to international link in the Philippines
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coalition, for example, was the Philippine Development Forum, a pre-existing network of
national and international NGOs.  The link between Indonesian national NGOs and
international actors was provided by the Indonesian NGO Forum for International
Development (INFID), a pre-existing forum of large Indonesian NGOs and international
actors that support them.  The nucleus of the national to international coalition on the
information and inspection panel policy drew on relationships built during the
international campaign against the Narmada Dam in India..  These chains, once forged,
can be used for other purposes.  Investments in such linkages may be productive long
after their initial impetus has passed away.
Lesson 7: The internet is not enough to build trust across cultures. Face-to-face
negotiations can clarify goals, strategies, responsibilities and accountability.
Coalitions evolve over time in response to external and internal forces.  At the outset,
most transnational coalitions are loosely organized around shared values and visions
rather than detailed strategies and responsibilities.  But policy influence campaigns often
require systematic articulation of goals, development of strategies and plans, and
agreement on how to implement those plans.  Without agreement on who is responsible
for what, it is difficult to hold one another accountable, or even to know how or where
influence might be exerted to shape coalition activities.
Transnational coalitions are by definition geographically dispersed, and consequently face
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difficulties in negotiating shared expectations.  To some extent, modern information
technology enables interactive decision-making.  The coalition to reform the information
and inspection panel policy made extensive use of electronic communications.  But there
is no substitute for face-to-face negotiations in creating trust and mutual influence in
these coalitions.  Members of the Narmada Action Council report that visits to the
Valley were essential to building their relationships and strengthening their commitment
to the campaign.  The director of the Philippine Development Forum attributed her
loyalty to the indigenous elders to her personal contacts with them.  Face-to-face
engagements among key individuals shape the coalition's social capital, influence patterns
and membership.
Lesson 8:  Small links can make strong chains. Individuals and small organizations
linking larger actors wield great influence.
The most visible actors in these cases are national governments, large international
institutions and social movements composed of thousands of members.  The stakes
involve millions of dollars, thousands of lives and scores of countries.  Given the stakes,
it is striking what pivotal roles a few key individuals and organizations play in bridging
the chasms that separate many of the actors. 
The effectiveness of transnational coalitions depends on trust and mutual influence
among individuals and organizations along the chain.  Conflicting pulls and incentives
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can easily pull apart coalitions, and coalitions are difficult to reassemble once
disintegrated.  The Narmada Action Council, composed of a small number of
organizational representatives from Northern countries as well as key leaders in India,
coordinated lobbying activities around the globe that eventually was central to forcing the
Banks reluctant withdrawal from the Narmada Dam project.  Some of the Councils
members then acted as the nucleus for the campaign to reform the Bank's policies on
information and inspection panels.  In effect, a virtual organization of less than twenty
people played a central role in reshaping the institutional characteristics of the world's
most influential development organization.  Key individuals and organizations--acting as
bridges in a global network--can have influence wildly disproportionate to their wealth or
formal power.
Transnational Coalitions and Global Influence
When we began this study more than eight years ago, very little had been published on
the roles of transnational coalitions in shaping global policies.  In the last five years, the
research available on this topic has grown very rapidly.10  Coalitions are essential to civil
society organizations seeking to influence events beyond the ordinary scope of small,
often disenfranchised locally-based actors.  But building trust and understanding across
gaps of wealth, power and culture does not come easily to civil society leaders, who are
more accustomed to influencing those who share their values, aspirations and
expectations.  The "David and Goliath encounters between civil society coalitions and
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the World Bank described in this paper suggest that civil society actors can have wider
influence, if they can build bridges across their differences, understand their institutional
targets, and learn from failures and successes. 
One of the most important lessons of the World Bank campaign experience for other civil
society efforts to hold powerful transnational actors accountable points to a shifting
North-to-South center of gravity. In the early years of the Bank campaigns, Southern
coalition partners provided the credibility while Northern NGOs had the media influence
and political clout with donor governments that turned out to be critical for extracting
commitments to environmental and social policy reform. These policy reforms set
important benchmark standards, but have proven to be limited in terms of their capacity
to change what the World Bank and its national government partners actually do in
practice most of the time. Reform promises from the World Bank are no substitute for
democratizing nation-state development aid strategies in both North and South.
More generally, whether the issue is Bank reform, human rights or corporate
accountability, local-global linkages can be quite successful at damage control, or at
extracting promises of reform. But then what? Tangibly changing the ways powerful
institutions actually behave requires more than campaigns. Only by bolstering local,
national and transnational capacities to monitor, target and sanction non-compliance with
reform commitments can apparent campaign victories be translated into sustained
accountability.
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